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Abstract: This Trends article discusses and evaluates public discourse surrounding the acceptability of 
militarily invading Iraq through a social psychological perspective.  In social psychology, the research 
tradition for constructs such as free-riding and social loafing suggests that, wittingly or unwittingly, 
many political actors assume that the United States will act to address actual political threats in a certain 
way, and that they (the other political actors) can adopt contrarian ideological stances because they 
don’t have to address those same threats.  
 
Public discourse on the acceptability of militarily invading Iraq is often couched in rules of engagement 
featuring reason, rationality, and logic.  And these rules focus on strategic, ethical/moral, and domestic 
political considerations on the nature of threat, military intervention, and its consequences.  However, 
at least one research tradition from social psychology might highlight another contributor to public 
discourse.  
 
The research tradition for constructs such as free-riding and social loafing suggests that, wittingly or 
unwittingly, many political actors are not bellying up to the bar of honest discourse and action because 
they feel that they don't have to.  According to this narrative, the United States as superpower will do 
what has to be done, and other political actors, therefore, do not have to.  Instead, these other actors 
can quibble; take privileged, purely abstract, and largely contrarian ideological positions; or assert their 
own prerogatives to address instrumental economic issue, without having to bear the brunt of 
addressing what may be a looming and significant threat.  
 
The social psychological literature comprises some suggestions for what might attenuate the psychology 
of free-riding and social loafing.  For example, Sweeney (1973) posits that the smaller a group within 
which a political actor resides, the less likelihood there is of free-riding and social loafing.  He also posits 
that the psychology is less likely to occur if a private good accompanies contributing to a public good.  
From Duffy & Shaw's (2000) work on the Salieri Syndrome, one might posit that envy within a group of 
political actors (and inter-actor directed) leads to an increase in the psychology.  Henningsen et al. 
(2000) posit that when actors expect to work alone and not engage in value-tinged acts, the psychology 
is less likely.  Harkins (1987) suggests that public accountability/identifiability may lead to a decrease in 
the psychology.   
 
The above psychological findings might be appropriately validated for replicability and for social, 
cultural, and historical constraints.  Then the findings could be operationalized for the praxis of 
diplomacy and negotiations.  In the meantime, some political actors may continue to engage Truth 
through not engaging Truth.  (See Duffy, M. K., & Shaw, J. D.  (2000). The Salieri Syndrome: 
Consequences of envy in groups.  Small Group Research, 31, 3-23; Harkins, S.G.  (1987).  Social loafing 
and social facilitation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 23, 1-18; Henningsen, D. D., Cruz, M. 
G., &Miller, M. L. (2000). Role of social loafing in predeliberation decision making. Group Dynamics, 4, 
168-175; Latane, B., Williams, K., & Harkins, S.  (1979). Many hands make light the work: The causes and 
consequences of social loafing. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 37, 822-832; Sweeney, J.W.  
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(1973). An experimental investigation of the free-rider problem. Social Science Research, 2, 277-292.) 
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